
Last 4 earnings calls · through Q2 FY2026
The bull case is that the company-owned clinics have shown they can make money at the center level, so growth now depends on how fast that model is copied into new cities.
Buying for the whole chain and launching exclusive products with manufacturers gives So-Young lower consumable costs and repeat visits that a single clinic cannot arrange.
Most new patients arrive through referrals from existing ones rather than paid advertising, so the chain can keep opening clinics without acquisition costs eating the gains.
Management now puts a near-term timetable on clinic and group profitability instead of a general aspiration, which is the claim the bear case has to argue against.
The bear case is that the reservation platform, which once supplied the group's profit, keeps losing paying providers while the clinic chain is still being paid for.
Every new clinic absorbs capital before it earns, so the group's cash balance has fallen while the network is still far from the size management says it wants.
At the group level So-Young still reports net losses, and the clinic segment's profitability has repeatedly been described as approaching rather than reached.
The chain sells standardized treatment in cities full of single-store clinics, and management expects competition to stay intense, which limits what it can charge.
In short: Clinic revenue is compounding as centers open, while the older platform business it replaces keeps shrinking.
Same-store sales grew 52% against 14% a year earlier, and revenue per ramp-up center rose. Faster ramp means each new clinic needs less cash before it contributes, which is what makes continued expansion financeable.
Products So-Young co-develops or distributes exclusively, such as Miracle PLLA and the Jinbo collagen line, are a growing share of clinic revenue. Buying them direct lowers consumable costs and gives patients a reason to return.
Management once expected the non-clinic businesses to stabilize within a quarter. The reservation platform has kept losing paying providers and no new floor has been given, and those businesses still supply profit while clinics are loss-making.
Management used to commit to a minimum number of new clinics each year. It now says the opening pace will follow how heavily existing centers are used, which leaves less visibility on the unit growth delivered next year.
In short: Clinic gross margin is rising and group losses are narrowing, while the build-out keeps drawing down cash.
The operating margin improved to -8.6% from -12.4% a year earlier as revenue outgrew operating expenses. Operating leverage at group level is what turns clinic expansion into profit rather than permanent losses.
Aesthetic treatment gross margin reached 28.1%, up 3.8 points from a year earlier, even while new clinics were opening. Higher clinic gross margin is the main lever management cites for reaching segment profit.
Earlier calls said margins would improve as the operating model matured. Management now expects further clinic gross margin gains in the second half of this year, which turns a general promise into something that can be checked.
Gross margin dropped to 44.1% from 51.3% a year earlier because owned clinics keep less of each yuan of revenue than the platform services they replace. The group now earns a thinner margin on far more revenue.
Net cash stood at $654 million against $854 million a year earlier, and the clinic segment has not yet broken even. Building at this pace depends on the remaining balance lasting until centers turn profitable.
In short: It runs China's largest light medical aesthetic chain, but fragmented local competition limits pricing.
So-Young says it is the largest light medical aesthetic chain in China by clinic count, a position no single-city operator holds. That scale underpins brand recognition and, management argues, lower costs per patient.
Buying injectables and devices for the whole chain lets So-Young sign volume agreements directly with manufacturers. Procurement is the largest variable cost in a clinic, so better buying terms feed straight into clinic gross margin.
Most clinics outside the biggest cities are single-store operators, and management expects competition to remain intense. That limits how much the chain can charge for standard treatments no competitor struggles to offer.
Revenue fell 25.7% in FY2022 and the operating margin dropped to -8.2%, showing that spending on optional aesthetic treatment can contract quickly. A chain carrying fixed clinic costs has little protection when that happens.