
Last 4 earnings calls · through Q2 FY2026
The bull case is that years of cost control have turned high gold prices into free cash flow far faster than the cost base rises, so margins hold even as royalties climb.
Newmont now returns most of its excess cash through buybacks and a fixed dividend, so the share count falls and each remaining share owns more of the same production.
Delivery at Ahafo North and the expansions at Tanami, Cadia and Lihir are meant to lift output back after the 2026 low, so the growth case rests on schedule and budget.
A reserve base measured in decades and a portfolio spread across twelve mines give Newmont flexibility over which ounces to mine first when prices or costs move.
The bear case is that output bottoms out before those projects arrive, so unit costs stay exposed to higher royalties and fuel while the fixed cost base keeps running.
Because royalties and profit-sharing agreements rise with the gold price, a larger share of any price gain goes to governments and workers rather than to Newmont.
Control of Nevada Gold Mines sits with a partner Newmont has formally accused of mismanagement, so a large slice of output depends on a relationship it does not run.
Ghana wants local firms to take over mining work and oil prices are lifting diesel, so costs outside management's control erode the benefit of a strong gold price.
In short: Ahafo North was delivered on budget, but 2026 output falls to a trough before projects lift it again.
The mine reached commercial production as planned and management expects total spend at the low end of its range, which supports the case that Newmont can build on budget.
Management previously described Yanacocha as moving to leaching only; it now adds a low-capital mining phase running into early 2027 with further upside.
Management calls 2026 a production trough, so fixed costs spread over fewer ounces and the return to growth depends on Tanami, Cadia and Lihir finishing as planned.
Management said in February it expected to give a longer-term outlook by the end of 2026; it now targets February 2027, so the recovery plan is unpublished.
In short: Cash generation is strong and the balance sheet holds net cash, while fuel and royalties push costs up.
Consistent beats show the cost program is landing in reported results rather than only in guidance, which matters when so much of the margin comes from the gold price.
Previously management would only say it would stay disciplined within the framework; it now directs all cash above its net cash target into repurchases.
Management quantifies about $60 million of annual cost for every $10 move in a barrel of oil, and higher fuel also raises the freight and consumables bought alongside it.
For every $100 rise in gold, management expects all-in sustaining costs to rise $6, so part of any price gain is paid away rather than kept as margin.
In short: The reserve base is the largest in gold, but a disputed joint venture and Ghana's rules limit control.
A reserve of 118 million ounces plus 149 million ounces of resource underpins long mine plans, so Newmont can choose which ounces to mine first as prices and costs move.
Newmont is the third largest silver producer, and revenue from silver, copper, lead and zinc is credited against gold costs, so the byproduct mix supports its cost position.
Newmont disclosed a notice of default in February; by July it said direct engagement was nearly over with key issues unresolved, so the dispute is escalating.
The government wants contractor mining moved to Ghanaian firms, and management says local capacity does not cover the more technically complex work, putting Ahafo productivity at risk.