
Last 4 earnings calls · through Q2 FY2026
The bull case is that Diamondback owns the deepest low-cost inventory in the Permian, so additional capital goes into wells that pay back quickly.
Management restarted growth within weeks of a price signal because the drilling backlog and spare crews were already in place rather than needing to be built.
Free cash flow is going to debt reduction and buybacks, and as net debt falls the value of each remaining share rises without any new production.
New Barnett acreage and chemical treatments on older wells could add recoverable oil without buying more land or drilling entirely new sections.
The bear case is that the growth decision depends on oil prices nobody can forecast, and this plan has already been reversed once in the last year.
Barnett wells cost much more per foot than core Midland wells, so the returns depend on cost cuts that have not yet been shown across a full section.
Management removed its fixed commitment to return a set share of free cash, leaving the split between buybacks and debt repayment to its own judgment.
West Texas gas prices have turned negative and nearly all production sits in one basin, so realizations and operating problems arrive together.
In short: Output is growing again after a year of flat plans, but Barnett costs must fall for those wells to pay.
After three straight quarters of holding output flat under a yellow light, management added two to three rigs and a fifth frac crew and now points to low single-digit organic growth.
The data center and power effort was described as a long process with nothing to announce; management now cites secured generation, land and gas supply with first gas targeted for the second half of 2027.
Barnett wells run near $1,000 a foot against roughly $520 in the core, so the play only competes if larger pads and continuous pumping bring costs down to about $800 a foot.
Capital was cut by $500 million in 2025 and production slipped when prices looked weak, so the current growth plan rests on a price outlook management itself calls fluid.
In short: Free cash flow is strong and debt is falling, but management dropped its fixed formula for returning cash.
The business produced $3.7 billion of free cash flow over the last twelve months, equal to 21.5% of revenue, after a cash deficit in the comparable earlier period.
Net debt sits at $12.2 billion versus $14.9 billion a year earlier, and management expects to reach its $10 billion goal in a couple of months rather than the original 12 to 18.
Management previously outlined the base dividend plus buybacks of at least 1% of the public float each quarter; it now says it will not commit to returning a minimum share of free cash.
The charge on proved properties followed reserve revisions driven largely by lower prices, showing how fast assets booked in an acquisition lose carrying value when the oil price used to value them falls.
In short: Inventory depth leads the basin, but negative Waha gas prices and a single-basin footprint weigh on it.
New pipeline capacity should take Waha exposure from about 70% of gas sales to just over 40% by the end of 2026, which matters because West Texas gas prices have gone deeply negative.
Management completes about 500 wells a year against roughly 5,000 to 5,500 core locations, and keeps adding zones and lateral length, which supports the long-duration inventory claim.
When Waha pricing collapsed in October the company shut in 2,000 to 3,000 barrels a day of production, and it says it is likely doing something similar again with in-basin gas prices negative.
Revenue fell 29.0% in FY2020 and the operating margin swung from 17.5% to negative 194.7%, showing how little of the cost base adjusts when prices drop.